民政党代表大会\党选过了。
我始终觉得民政党很虚伪，自我标榜为多元种族，也曾经一阵子因为多元种族没太大市场而改为非种族，但是改来改去，该党的路是越走越窄，人也越来越少。
到了这次党选，丁福南明明是理想人选，却硬硬被压下来，说什么要排出一个多元种族阵容，但是代表不接受这一套，选出了一个来自槟州的“阿HUAN”，这回就看子根这么处理这个菜单外的人选了！
如果说是多元种族阵容，君不见在全国大选时，民政党的候选人又怎么会是清一色华人呢？
还有，你明知道马华、民政惨败，不是国阵开放不开放党员问题，也不是十多个成员党解散后一起加入国阵成为单一政党就可以解决的。
问题大家都知道是在哪里，套用槟城人的一句口头蝉：不必问阿贵也知道！
还有拿为“阿花”大姐，一下子说要退出国阵，最近又说要留在国阵“纠正国阵”，拜托，民政党就是因为“打进国阵，纠正国阵”而成为千古笑柄啊！
Saturday, October 11, 2008
Thursday, October 9, 2008
GOP这回害死人
以前商人一直在提倡"小政府"，认为政府的管制越少越好，就让那只看不到的手去操作。
结果，整个制度给弄坏了，造成今天这么凄凉的处境。
从经济泡沫到政治泡沫 ——共和党“永久多数”的破灭
（2008-10-09）
于时语
近年来，美国出现一连串的经济泡沫，先是世纪之交的高科技泡沫，紧接着是房地产泡沫，再到最新的华尔街金融泡沫，从出现、暴涨到破灭的周期之快，令人目不暇接。
但是在政治领域，美国还有一个演变速度更惊人的泡沫，这便是喧嚣一时的共和党“永久多数”。最新的征象，是在华尔街金融泡沫破灭之际，却有三分之二的共和党众议员一开始投票反对布什政府的7000亿美元救市法案。
在共和党草根“造反”的老生常谈之外，《华尔街日报》精明地指出：反对救市法案的，多是11月大选中席位风雨飘摇的两党议员，而其中共和党人占绝对多数，反映了该党面临的恶劣选情。
“永久多数”有其基础
自从在1994年中期选举中，40年来首次夺得美国众议院多数席位，共和党在国会选战中几乎是无往不胜。共和党在2004年的大选中达到高峰，如日中天，“永久多数”之说因之甚嚣尘上。
2004年，不仅布什总统以多数选民票获得连任，共和党显著扩大了在参众两院的绝对多数。更有甚者，共和党还全面动员，将民主党在全美政界的最高人物、身为参议院少数党领袖的南达科他州的达斯勒（Tom Daschle）给拉下马，创造了半个多世纪未见的政治奇迹。
“保守主义革命”大潮势不可挡，弹冠相庆的保守派人士纷纷认为共和党的“永久多数”将会维持一代人以上。著名右翼论客巴恩斯（Fred Barnes）更预言未来数十年眼看都是“共和党霸权”（Republican hegemony）的天下。
可是短短两年之后，民主党便在2006年中期选举中以微弱多数夺回参、众两院的控制。今年大选前景，前引《华尔街日报》的前瞻性分析已经说得十分明白。更重要的是美国政治生态和经济状况的沧桑演变，使得共和党“永久多数”成为美国近代史上周期最短的政治泡沫。
在“意识形态”上，共和党“永久多数”的基础可以归纳为：第一，减少政府的社会功能和对经济的干预（“小政府”主义）。最好的例子是里根总统的就职演说：“政府不是我们问题的解答；问题本身正是政府。”
第二，保守的社会“价值”。第三，基于武力的强硬外交政策。
共和党意识形态的破产
在政治操作上，共和党“永久多数”依靠的是严密有效的基层组织，以及企业捐款与国会立法之间的“良性互动”。前者得益于基督教右翼，而后者在于成功控制华盛顿K街上的游说公关公司，一时令民主党徒呼荷荷。
成也萧何，败也萧何。正如多数论客将共和党“永久多数”归功于“价值”因素，这一泡沫破灭的主因，也在于意识形态的破产。曾几何时，里根总统大力推动的减少政府管制（deregulation），今天被普遍看成是房地产泡沫和金融泡沫的孽因。
这种经济思想20年来的英雄功臣、前美国联储局主席格林斯潘，近日居然被意大利右翼政府财长指责为“对美国伤害仅次于宾拉登的罪魁”。
被里根总统看成是经济和社会问题根源的政府，如今却成为华尔街“肥猫”们的救星。一直主张紧缩社会福利开支的共和党领袖，却公开实施“救富社会主义”。这样赤裸裸的政策逆转，不能不导致共和党中下层社会基础的政治幻灭，触发共和党籍众议员无奈的“造反”。
其次，“反恐”战争在伊拉克和阿富汗的泥沼，严重打击了美国公众对强硬外交政策的信念，成为共和党在意识形态上破产的另一重要原因。相对而言，尽管有包括副总统候选人佩林未成年女儿未婚怀孕的多项道德丑闻，保守社会价值几乎是共和党剩下的唯一意识形态“稻草”。
选民取决于自身的利益
在政治操作层面，共和党在掌握国会两院多数后的财务腐败，不仅逆转了共和党“K街计划”的许多成果，更造成公众对利益集团政治献金的反感。另外政治嗅觉灵敏的不少企业界看到“永久多数”的末日，开始重抱民主党的大腿，急剧减少了共和党的政治捐款优势。
在民主社会中，选民意向终究取决于自身利益，在房地产泡沫和金融泡沫相继破灭之后，对大部分民众而言，经济利益不能不压倒“价值”考虑。尤其是与高科技泡沫不同，银行金融股票原是美国中产阶级投资或退休基金中“蓝筹中的蓝筹”，房产金融泡沫的破灭，严重伤到了大部分中产阶级的财产筋骨。共和党基层组织再有效率，也无法抗衡这一经济现实。
在普遍看成是大萧条以来最严重经济危机之下，奥巴马如果不是身为黑人，11月大选几乎是探囊取物。在国会，共和党四年前“永久多数”泡沫的彻底覆灭，更是可以翘足而待。
结果，整个制度给弄坏了，造成今天这么凄凉的处境。
从经济泡沫到政治泡沫 ——共和党“永久多数”的破灭
（2008-10-09）
于时语
近年来，美国出现一连串的经济泡沫，先是世纪之交的高科技泡沫，紧接着是房地产泡沫，再到最新的华尔街金融泡沫，从出现、暴涨到破灭的周期之快，令人目不暇接。
但是在政治领域，美国还有一个演变速度更惊人的泡沫，这便是喧嚣一时的共和党“永久多数”。最新的征象，是在华尔街金融泡沫破灭之际，却有三分之二的共和党众议员一开始投票反对布什政府的7000亿美元救市法案。
在共和党草根“造反”的老生常谈之外，《华尔街日报》精明地指出：反对救市法案的，多是11月大选中席位风雨飘摇的两党议员，而其中共和党人占绝对多数，反映了该党面临的恶劣选情。
“永久多数”有其基础
自从在1994年中期选举中，40年来首次夺得美国众议院多数席位，共和党在国会选战中几乎是无往不胜。共和党在2004年的大选中达到高峰，如日中天，“永久多数”之说因之甚嚣尘上。
2004年，不仅布什总统以多数选民票获得连任，共和党显著扩大了在参众两院的绝对多数。更有甚者，共和党还全面动员，将民主党在全美政界的最高人物、身为参议院少数党领袖的南达科他州的达斯勒（Tom Daschle）给拉下马，创造了半个多世纪未见的政治奇迹。
“保守主义革命”大潮势不可挡，弹冠相庆的保守派人士纷纷认为共和党的“永久多数”将会维持一代人以上。著名右翼论客巴恩斯（Fred Barnes）更预言未来数十年眼看都是“共和党霸权”（Republican hegemony）的天下。
可是短短两年之后，民主党便在2006年中期选举中以微弱多数夺回参、众两院的控制。今年大选前景，前引《华尔街日报》的前瞻性分析已经说得十分明白。更重要的是美国政治生态和经济状况的沧桑演变，使得共和党“永久多数”成为美国近代史上周期最短的政治泡沫。
在“意识形态”上，共和党“永久多数”的基础可以归纳为：第一，减少政府的社会功能和对经济的干预（“小政府”主义）。最好的例子是里根总统的就职演说：“政府不是我们问题的解答；问题本身正是政府。”
第二，保守的社会“价值”。第三，基于武力的强硬外交政策。
共和党意识形态的破产
在政治操作上，共和党“永久多数”依靠的是严密有效的基层组织，以及企业捐款与国会立法之间的“良性互动”。前者得益于基督教右翼，而后者在于成功控制华盛顿K街上的游说公关公司，一时令民主党徒呼荷荷。
成也萧何，败也萧何。正如多数论客将共和党“永久多数”归功于“价值”因素，这一泡沫破灭的主因，也在于意识形态的破产。曾几何时，里根总统大力推动的减少政府管制（deregulation），今天被普遍看成是房地产泡沫和金融泡沫的孽因。
这种经济思想20年来的英雄功臣、前美国联储局主席格林斯潘，近日居然被意大利右翼政府财长指责为“对美国伤害仅次于宾拉登的罪魁”。
被里根总统看成是经济和社会问题根源的政府，如今却成为华尔街“肥猫”们的救星。一直主张紧缩社会福利开支的共和党领袖，却公开实施“救富社会主义”。这样赤裸裸的政策逆转，不能不导致共和党中下层社会基础的政治幻灭，触发共和党籍众议员无奈的“造反”。
其次，“反恐”战争在伊拉克和阿富汗的泥沼，严重打击了美国公众对强硬外交政策的信念，成为共和党在意识形态上破产的另一重要原因。相对而言，尽管有包括副总统候选人佩林未成年女儿未婚怀孕的多项道德丑闻，保守社会价值几乎是共和党剩下的唯一意识形态“稻草”。
选民取决于自身的利益
在政治操作层面，共和党在掌握国会两院多数后的财务腐败，不仅逆转了共和党“K街计划”的许多成果，更造成公众对利益集团政治献金的反感。另外政治嗅觉灵敏的不少企业界看到“永久多数”的末日，开始重抱民主党的大腿，急剧减少了共和党的政治捐款优势。
在民主社会中，选民意向终究取决于自身利益，在房地产泡沫和金融泡沫相继破灭之后，对大部分民众而言，经济利益不能不压倒“价值”考虑。尤其是与高科技泡沫不同，银行金融股票原是美国中产阶级投资或退休基金中“蓝筹中的蓝筹”，房产金融泡沫的破灭，严重伤到了大部分中产阶级的财产筋骨。共和党基层组织再有效率，也无法抗衡这一经济现实。
在普遍看成是大萧条以来最严重经济危机之下，奥巴马如果不是身为黑人，11月大选几乎是探囊取物。在国会，共和党四年前“永久多数”泡沫的彻底覆灭，更是可以翘足而待。
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Toxic loans v 有毒奶粉
中国有毒奶粉的新闻看了令人痛心，的确在中国，人命是无价，不值钱的。
但是，不要忘记，美国的金融风暴，也是有毒的，接下来会害死很多人。
次贷有毒，请看以下文章：-
Calling Out the Culprits Who Caused the Crisis
By Eric D. HovdeSunday, September 21, 2008; B01
Looking for someone to blame for the shambles in U.S. financial markets? As someone who owns both an investment bank and commercial banks, and also runs a hedge fund, I have sat front and center and watched as this mess unfolded. And in my view, there's no need to look beyond Wall Street -- and the halls of power in Washington. The former has created the nightmare by chasing obscene profits, and the latter have allowed it to spread by not practicing the oversight that is the federal government's responsibility.
I find it hard to stomach the fact that investment banks that caused this financial crisis immediately ran to the government asking for assistance, which Bear Stearns received and Lehman Brothers, thankfully, did not. This is one of many eerie parallels that the current meltdown bears to the Great Depression, when Washington and the taxpayers had to step up and take unprecedented action to stabilize the financial markets and the economy.
Unfortunately, the government today has already put enormous taxpayer resources at risk -- bailing out investment firm Bear Stearns, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and insurer AIG, and proposing to buy risky assets from the banking system -- to stop the economy from plummeting into another depression. But these events only underscore the toxic relationship between Washington and Wall Street that has brought us to this point.
To understand the role of that relationship in our current troubles, let's go back to 1999. That was when the hype about the Internet reached its pinnacle. Technology spending by the government and corporations was booming as both sought to address economic and security fears surrounding the so-called Y2K problem, a potential massive computer shutdown at the start of the year 2000.
In the run-up to the millennium, the Federal Reserve, led by then-Chairman Alan Greenspan, began to pump money into the capital markets to deal with any financial problems that might arise from a Y2K meltdown. In the end, 2000 arrived to nothing but a wonderful celebration. But the monetary stimulus, coupled with the aforementioned hype, created an unfortunate bubble in Internet, technology and telecommunications stocks.
At the center of this bubble were the large Wall Street investment banks, which understood the profit potential in promoting the technology boom to overeager clients looking for the investment of a lifetime. From mid-1999 to mid-2000, Wall Street firms took approximately 500 companies public, raising a total of nearly $77 billion for these companies through initial public offerings, or IPOs. For every IPO, the investment banks themselves earned an underwriting fee of 6 percent, returning them an enormous profit.
But apparently that was not enough for Wall Street. As the middlemen between the insatiable investor demand for anything technology-related and young tech entrepreneurs needing to raise capital, the investment banks demanded the opportunity to invest in these companies before the public offerings, when the companies's stocks were valued at a fraction of what they would bring post-IPO. It wasn't uncommon for Wall Street firms to invest tens of millions of dollars in "anything.com" before taking it public, charge a multimillion-dollar fee for the public offering and then watch their investment multiply within a matter of months.
Main Street investors, meanwhile, did not realize that the investment banks had essentially thrown away their underwriting guidelines, which had been in place since the Depression, to take companies public. Among these guidelines were rules requiring that a company be in business for more than five years, be profitable for two or three consecutive years and have certain levels of revenue and profitability. The business models of many of the companies that went public simply weren't viable. Once the Internet bubble burst and the dust settled, America's corporate landscape was littered with bankruptcies and mass layoffs, and investor losses have been estimated at more than $1 trillion.
In an effort to offset the economic strain from these losses, the Fed once again rapidly increased the money supply and slashed short-term interest rates to 1 percent -- a level that hadn't been seen in more than 45 years. This enormous monetary stimulus (along with significant federal spending) energized the overall economy, but it also led to the greatest housing boom -- and possible bust -- this country has ever encountered. From 2002 to 2006, housing values appreciated at an astounding rate of 16 percent per year. It became impossible for the typical American family to buy an average-priced house using a conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Wall Street found another perfect opportunity to propel and take advantage of another forming bubble.
The result was the explosion of toxic new mortgage products that enticed homebuyers into supporting escalating housing prices while eliminating the need for the traditional 20 percent down payment. Whether it was interest-only loans, low- or no-doc "liar loans," or piggyback home-equity loans, the mortgage and banking industries found a way to place almost anyone with -- or even without -- a credit score into a home. Wall Street played its part by packaging those mortgages into complex financial products and selling them to other investors, many of whom had no idea of what they were buying or the associated risks.
Once again, the investment banks raked in billions of dollars in fees, giving them incentive to keep lowering underwriting standards, allowing mortgage companies to originate and sell even the most unscrupulous home loans, which Wall Street then dumped onto the investment community. Wall Street never once questioned the ethics of these activities; it too was focused on the enormous rewards that allowed its firms to pay out an unfathomable $62 billion in bonuses in 2006 alone. Without Wall Street, the housing bubble would have ended shortly after the Fed started to raise interest rates in 2004, because no lenders would have originated these toxic mortgages if they had to keep the loans on their own balance sheets.
The price of all this greed? Sadly, because of the actions of the investment banks, the mortgage industry and the rating agencies, the investment community has now incurred an estimated $1 trillion and more in losses. Even more troubling, housing prices have dropped 20 percent from their July 2006 highs, with the very real likelihood that housing could contract another 15 to 20 percent -- essentially wiping out more than $4 trillion in housing values. This would be the biggest hit since the Depression to Americans' most important asset.
What is even more remarkable is that at the same time, firms such as Goldman Sachs and Lehman not only made billions of dollars packaging and selling these toxic loans, they also wagered with their own capital that the values of these investments would decline, further raising their profits. If any other industries engaged in such knowingly unscrupulous activities, there would be an immediate federal investigation.
Why is Washington so complicit in this intricate and lucrative affair? First, the Fed laid the groundwork for both these asset bubbles by lowering interest rates to historic lows. In an attempt to protect his legacy after the Internet-bubble collapse, Greenspan provided unprecedented stimulus to re-inflate the economy and maintain his popularity with Wall Street. (Remember the "Greenspan put"?) But in doing so, he spawned the largest debt and asset bubble in U.S. history.
At the same time, federal regulatory agencies such as the SEC stood idly by as Wall Street took advantage of the investment public during both the Internet and the housing bubbles. The SEC took almost no action against Wall Street after the dot-com implosion. And in the midst of the housing bubble, in 2006, only the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency pushed for any level of regulation to address subprime lending.
One has to wonder why Treasury secretaries under Presidents Clinton and Bush -- Robert Rubin and Hank Paulson, respectively -- took no action to curb these abuses. It certainly was not because they did not understand Wall Street's practices -- both are former chief executives of Goldman Sachs. And why has Congress been so silent? The Wall Street investment banking firms, their executives, their families and their political action committees contribute more to U.S. Senate and House campaigns than any other industry in America. By sprinkling some of its massive gains into the pockets of our elected officials, Wall Street bought itself protection from any tough government enforcement.
This is no doubt the same reason why so many members of Congress were consistently blocking attempts to reform and downsize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are essentially giant, undercapitalized hedge funds. These two entities have been huge money machines for Democrats in both the House and the Senate, many of whom recently had the gall to ask why these companies hadn't been reformed in the past. Nor should several Republican congressmen and Senators who likewise contributed to watering down legislation aimed at reforming these institutions be let off the hook.
Wall Street's actions are now profoundly hurting American families, communities and the entire U.S. financial system. People are being thrown out of their homes. Once seemingly indestructible financial entities are succumbing to the crisis they have created and have jeopardized the stability of the global financial system. Isn't it ironic that the same firms that preached free-market capitalism are now the ones begging for a taxpayer bailout? Many investment professionals operating in my world believe, as do I, that we are facing the greatest financial crisis since 1929.
Fortunately, today we have safety nets, such as federal deposit insurance, that were non-existent during the Great Depression. Yet there has not been a time since the 1920s when Wall Street has enjoyed as much influence over Washington as it has for the last 12 years. Let's hope that this influence fades rapidly -- and that this financial crisis doesn't end the same way as the one of nearly 80 years ago.
Eric D. Hovde is chief executive of Washington-based Hovde Capital and Hovde Acquisitions.
但是，不要忘记，美国的金融风暴，也是有毒的，接下来会害死很多人。
次贷有毒，请看以下文章：-
Calling Out the Culprits Who Caused the Crisis
By Eric D. HovdeSunday, September 21, 2008; B01
Looking for someone to blame for the shambles in U.S. financial markets? As someone who owns both an investment bank and commercial banks, and also runs a hedge fund, I have sat front and center and watched as this mess unfolded. And in my view, there's no need to look beyond Wall Street -- and the halls of power in Washington. The former has created the nightmare by chasing obscene profits, and the latter have allowed it to spread by not practicing the oversight that is the federal government's responsibility.
I find it hard to stomach the fact that investment banks that caused this financial crisis immediately ran to the government asking for assistance, which Bear Stearns received and Lehman Brothers, thankfully, did not. This is one of many eerie parallels that the current meltdown bears to the Great Depression, when Washington and the taxpayers had to step up and take unprecedented action to stabilize the financial markets and the economy.
Unfortunately, the government today has already put enormous taxpayer resources at risk -- bailing out investment firm Bear Stearns, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and insurer AIG, and proposing to buy risky assets from the banking system -- to stop the economy from plummeting into another depression. But these events only underscore the toxic relationship between Washington and Wall Street that has brought us to this point.
To understand the role of that relationship in our current troubles, let's go back to 1999. That was when the hype about the Internet reached its pinnacle. Technology spending by the government and corporations was booming as both sought to address economic and security fears surrounding the so-called Y2K problem, a potential massive computer shutdown at the start of the year 2000.
In the run-up to the millennium, the Federal Reserve, led by then-Chairman Alan Greenspan, began to pump money into the capital markets to deal with any financial problems that might arise from a Y2K meltdown. In the end, 2000 arrived to nothing but a wonderful celebration. But the monetary stimulus, coupled with the aforementioned hype, created an unfortunate bubble in Internet, technology and telecommunications stocks.
At the center of this bubble were the large Wall Street investment banks, which understood the profit potential in promoting the technology boom to overeager clients looking for the investment of a lifetime. From mid-1999 to mid-2000, Wall Street firms took approximately 500 companies public, raising a total of nearly $77 billion for these companies through initial public offerings, or IPOs. For every IPO, the investment banks themselves earned an underwriting fee of 6 percent, returning them an enormous profit.
But apparently that was not enough for Wall Street. As the middlemen between the insatiable investor demand for anything technology-related and young tech entrepreneurs needing to raise capital, the investment banks demanded the opportunity to invest in these companies before the public offerings, when the companies's stocks were valued at a fraction of what they would bring post-IPO. It wasn't uncommon for Wall Street firms to invest tens of millions of dollars in "anything.com" before taking it public, charge a multimillion-dollar fee for the public offering and then watch their investment multiply within a matter of months.
Main Street investors, meanwhile, did not realize that the investment banks had essentially thrown away their underwriting guidelines, which had been in place since the Depression, to take companies public. Among these guidelines were rules requiring that a company be in business for more than five years, be profitable for two or three consecutive years and have certain levels of revenue and profitability. The business models of many of the companies that went public simply weren't viable. Once the Internet bubble burst and the dust settled, America's corporate landscape was littered with bankruptcies and mass layoffs, and investor losses have been estimated at more than $1 trillion.
In an effort to offset the economic strain from these losses, the Fed once again rapidly increased the money supply and slashed short-term interest rates to 1 percent -- a level that hadn't been seen in more than 45 years. This enormous monetary stimulus (along with significant federal spending) energized the overall economy, but it also led to the greatest housing boom -- and possible bust -- this country has ever encountered. From 2002 to 2006, housing values appreciated at an astounding rate of 16 percent per year. It became impossible for the typical American family to buy an average-priced house using a conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Wall Street found another perfect opportunity to propel and take advantage of another forming bubble.
The result was the explosion of toxic new mortgage products that enticed homebuyers into supporting escalating housing prices while eliminating the need for the traditional 20 percent down payment. Whether it was interest-only loans, low- or no-doc "liar loans," or piggyback home-equity loans, the mortgage and banking industries found a way to place almost anyone with -- or even without -- a credit score into a home. Wall Street played its part by packaging those mortgages into complex financial products and selling them to other investors, many of whom had no idea of what they were buying or the associated risks.
Once again, the investment banks raked in billions of dollars in fees, giving them incentive to keep lowering underwriting standards, allowing mortgage companies to originate and sell even the most unscrupulous home loans, which Wall Street then dumped onto the investment community. Wall Street never once questioned the ethics of these activities; it too was focused on the enormous rewards that allowed its firms to pay out an unfathomable $62 billion in bonuses in 2006 alone. Without Wall Street, the housing bubble would have ended shortly after the Fed started to raise interest rates in 2004, because no lenders would have originated these toxic mortgages if they had to keep the loans on their own balance sheets.
The price of all this greed? Sadly, because of the actions of the investment banks, the mortgage industry and the rating agencies, the investment community has now incurred an estimated $1 trillion and more in losses. Even more troubling, housing prices have dropped 20 percent from their July 2006 highs, with the very real likelihood that housing could contract another 15 to 20 percent -- essentially wiping out more than $4 trillion in housing values. This would be the biggest hit since the Depression to Americans' most important asset.
What is even more remarkable is that at the same time, firms such as Goldman Sachs and Lehman not only made billions of dollars packaging and selling these toxic loans, they also wagered with their own capital that the values of these investments would decline, further raising their profits. If any other industries engaged in such knowingly unscrupulous activities, there would be an immediate federal investigation.
Why is Washington so complicit in this intricate and lucrative affair? First, the Fed laid the groundwork for both these asset bubbles by lowering interest rates to historic lows. In an attempt to protect his legacy after the Internet-bubble collapse, Greenspan provided unprecedented stimulus to re-inflate the economy and maintain his popularity with Wall Street. (Remember the "Greenspan put"?) But in doing so, he spawned the largest debt and asset bubble in U.S. history.
At the same time, federal regulatory agencies such as the SEC stood idly by as Wall Street took advantage of the investment public during both the Internet and the housing bubbles. The SEC took almost no action against Wall Street after the dot-com implosion. And in the midst of the housing bubble, in 2006, only the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency pushed for any level of regulation to address subprime lending.
One has to wonder why Treasury secretaries under Presidents Clinton and Bush -- Robert Rubin and Hank Paulson, respectively -- took no action to curb these abuses. It certainly was not because they did not understand Wall Street's practices -- both are former chief executives of Goldman Sachs. And why has Congress been so silent? The Wall Street investment banking firms, their executives, their families and their political action committees contribute more to U.S. Senate and House campaigns than any other industry in America. By sprinkling some of its massive gains into the pockets of our elected officials, Wall Street bought itself protection from any tough government enforcement.
This is no doubt the same reason why so many members of Congress were consistently blocking attempts to reform and downsize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are essentially giant, undercapitalized hedge funds. These two entities have been huge money machines for Democrats in both the House and the Senate, many of whom recently had the gall to ask why these companies hadn't been reformed in the past. Nor should several Republican congressmen and Senators who likewise contributed to watering down legislation aimed at reforming these institutions be let off the hook.
Wall Street's actions are now profoundly hurting American families, communities and the entire U.S. financial system. People are being thrown out of their homes. Once seemingly indestructible financial entities are succumbing to the crisis they have created and have jeopardized the stability of the global financial system. Isn't it ironic that the same firms that preached free-market capitalism are now the ones begging for a taxpayer bailout? Many investment professionals operating in my world believe, as do I, that we are facing the greatest financial crisis since 1929.
Fortunately, today we have safety nets, such as federal deposit insurance, that were non-existent during the Great Depression. Yet there has not been a time since the 1920s when Wall Street has enjoyed as much influence over Washington as it has for the last 12 years. Let's hope that this influence fades rapidly -- and that this financial crisis doesn't end the same way as the one of nearly 80 years ago.
Eric D. Hovde is chief executive of Washington-based Hovde Capital and Hovde Acquisitions.
美国总统大选也是选法官
美国总统的选举除了是选总统之外，其实也在选最高法院的法官。
美国的最高法院法官是由总统提名，再由国会通过。民主党和共和党对一些关键性课题持有不同的看法，好象堕胎合法化就是一个尖锐的课题，在民间引起两极的看法。
纽约时报的社论就特别提醒美国的公民：
September 21, 2008
Editorial
The Candidates and the Court
Among the many issues voters need to consider in this campaign is this vital fact: The next president is likely to appoint several Supreme Court justices. Those choices will determine the future of the law, and of some of Americans’ most cherished rights.
John McCain and Barack Obama have made it clear that they would pick very different kinds of justices. The results could be particularly dramatic under Mr. McCain, who is likely to complete President Bush’s campaign to make the court an aggressive right-wing force.
Mr. Obama seems likely to pick moderate justices, who would probably not take the court back onto a distinctly liberal path, but also would be unlikely to create an unbreakable conservative bloc.
Mr. McCain has promised the right wing of the Republican Party that he would put only archconservatives on the Supreme Court. Even moderate conservatives like Anthony Kennedy, the court’s current swing justice, would not have a chance.
Mr. McCain, whose Web site proclaims his dedication to overturning Roe v. Wade, would appoint justices who could be expected to lead the charge to eliminate the right to abortion. The kinds of justices for whom Mr. McCain has expressed a strong preference would also be likely to undermine the right of habeas corpus, allowing the government to detain people indefinitely without access to lawyers or family members.
Mr. McCain’s justices are likely to join the conservative crusade against the power of Congress. They could be expected to strike down, or sharply limit, federal power to protect clean air and water; ensure food and drug safety; safeguard workers; and prohibit discrimination against women and minorities. They would also likely further erode the separation between church and state.
Mr. McCain has voted to confirm federal judges chosen by Mr. Bush who are radicals, not conservatives. One, Janice Rogers Brown, now on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has attacked Supreme Court decisions upholding New Deal laws as “the triumph of our own socialist revolution.”
Mr. Obama, a former professor of constitutional law, has clashed with Mr. McCain in the Senate over legal issues. Mr. McCain backed the odious Military Commissions Act of 2006, which the Supreme Court held to violate the right of habeas corpus; Mr. Obama opposed it. Mr. McCain was a rubber stamp for Mr. Bush’s judicial nominees; Mr. Obama voted against the worst.
Mr. Obama has said he wants justices who have “the empathy to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom” — as well as to be gay, poor or black. He has promised to make “preserving women’s rights under Roe v. Wade a priority as president.”
At the same time, Mr. Obama has put distance between himself and legal liberals on issues like the death penalty for child rapists and the constitutionality of gun control. As president, Mr. Obama would probably be more inclined to appoint centrist liberals, like Justice Stephen Breyer, than all-out liberals, like William Brennan or Thurgood Marshall.
Predicting vacancies on the court is difficult. But odds are that members of the liberal bloc, like 88-year-old John Paul Stevens, will leave first. That means that if Mr. Obama is elected, he might merely keep the court on its current moderately conservative course. Under Mr. McCain, if a liberal justice or two or three steps down, we may see a very different America.
美国的最高法院法官是由总统提名，再由国会通过。民主党和共和党对一些关键性课题持有不同的看法，好象堕胎合法化就是一个尖锐的课题，在民间引起两极的看法。
纽约时报的社论就特别提醒美国的公民：
September 21, 2008
Editorial
The Candidates and the Court
Among the many issues voters need to consider in this campaign is this vital fact: The next president is likely to appoint several Supreme Court justices. Those choices will determine the future of the law, and of some of Americans’ most cherished rights.
John McCain and Barack Obama have made it clear that they would pick very different kinds of justices. The results could be particularly dramatic under Mr. McCain, who is likely to complete President Bush’s campaign to make the court an aggressive right-wing force.
Mr. Obama seems likely to pick moderate justices, who would probably not take the court back onto a distinctly liberal path, but also would be unlikely to create an unbreakable conservative bloc.
Mr. McCain has promised the right wing of the Republican Party that he would put only archconservatives on the Supreme Court. Even moderate conservatives like Anthony Kennedy, the court’s current swing justice, would not have a chance.
Mr. McCain, whose Web site proclaims his dedication to overturning Roe v. Wade, would appoint justices who could be expected to lead the charge to eliminate the right to abortion. The kinds of justices for whom Mr. McCain has expressed a strong preference would also be likely to undermine the right of habeas corpus, allowing the government to detain people indefinitely without access to lawyers or family members.
Mr. McCain’s justices are likely to join the conservative crusade against the power of Congress. They could be expected to strike down, or sharply limit, federal power to protect clean air and water; ensure food and drug safety; safeguard workers; and prohibit discrimination against women and minorities. They would also likely further erode the separation between church and state.
Mr. McCain has voted to confirm federal judges chosen by Mr. Bush who are radicals, not conservatives. One, Janice Rogers Brown, now on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has attacked Supreme Court decisions upholding New Deal laws as “the triumph of our own socialist revolution.”
Mr. Obama, a former professor of constitutional law, has clashed with Mr. McCain in the Senate over legal issues. Mr. McCain backed the odious Military Commissions Act of 2006, which the Supreme Court held to violate the right of habeas corpus; Mr. Obama opposed it. Mr. McCain was a rubber stamp for Mr. Bush’s judicial nominees; Mr. Obama voted against the worst.
Mr. Obama has said he wants justices who have “the empathy to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom” — as well as to be gay, poor or black. He has promised to make “preserving women’s rights under Roe v. Wade a priority as president.”
At the same time, Mr. Obama has put distance between himself and legal liberals on issues like the death penalty for child rapists and the constitutionality of gun control. As president, Mr. Obama would probably be more inclined to appoint centrist liberals, like Justice Stephen Breyer, than all-out liberals, like William Brennan or Thurgood Marshall.
Predicting vacancies on the court is difficult. But odds are that members of the liberal bloc, like 88-year-old John Paul Stevens, will leave first. That means that if Mr. Obama is elected, he might merely keep the court on its current moderately conservative course. Under Mr. McCain, if a liberal justice or two or three steps down, we may see a very different America.
Saturday, September 20, 2008
钱 - 放在自己的口袋最安全
美国引发的金融风暴不知道几时才会落幕。但是，有一点可以肯定的是大家都会受影响。不管是你买保险，还是每月交付EPF，这些平时的积蓄将有一部分是投资在由美国所首创的“金融产品”。
很多人都知道在民间有所谓的“跟会”的投资玩意儿。目前美观的金融风暴就象是“会首”倒会的情形了，只是幅度是太大、太大了。
这里介绍一篇文章：-
財經漫遊：政府與投資者，都別再犯相同錯誤
沈雲驄
說實話，我不太相信，你真的明白雷曼兄弟、美林是怎麼垮的。就像你一定不知道，世界為了他們，到現在還亂成一團，但這些公司卻已悄悄佈局，就等你大駕光臨。
到雷曼兄弟官方網站看看。什麼破產，哪有災難，首頁上，這可是一家「全球金融創新者」，致力於「滿足政府、企業、高資產淨值投資人的需求」，且是「交易與研究」的「領先者」。營業狀況？網站上可以找到的財報，顯示著，過去五年來，公司不僅很賺錢，而且營業額、獲利能力、資產總額，年年都成長。那，最近的風暴是怎麼回事？很簡單，因為今年賠錢。不過，已經沒事了，新聞稿上輕描淡寫的說，雷曼兄弟北美的投資銀行與資本市場的業務──包括一萬名員工，以及最近遊客去拍照留念的總部大樓──都將由巴克萊銀行接手，繼續營業。安了。
不只是雷曼兄弟。看看已經易主的美林，官網首頁上，也毫不吝於跟大家分享自己已經被賣掉的消息，大方地寫著：「獲美國銀行收購」。網頁上引述美國銀行的話表示，能取得這麼一家「優質財富管理、資本市場與顧問公司，對我們的股東而言是很棒的機會」。「結合起來，」美國銀行董事長路易斯說：「我們的公司將更有價值。」
一副很有價值的樣子的，還包括半年前就已經出事的貝爾斯登。從這陣子媒體的報導來看，你很可能以為這公司早就壽終正寢。抱歉，錯了，貝爾斯登其實還在，而且「很高興地宣佈」，與摩根大通的合併已經完成。「這次併購，」該公司說：「結合了兩家優異的公司，以及最完整的金融服務。」然後，底下有個連結：「更多關於我們如何幫助客戶達到目標」。
也就是說，申請破產也好，被併購也好，風暴還沒過去，這些業者已把招牌擦亮，要繼續幫助你，完成你的財富夢想。這正是眼前這場金融危機，最可議與可怕之處。
可議的，是這些業者至今，沒有對自己的行為表示悔悟，絕口不提自己到底做錯了什麼、該負起什麼責任。不只美國，其他國家也一樣，業者們怪美國人捅出大婁子，怪總體經濟差，怪房地產冷，怪股市跌，也沒有說說看，自己不是標榜能幫顧客管理財富，不是口口聲聲能讓大家更有錢，為什麼沒有事先警告顧客，害得這麼多人賠錢？
可怕的，則是從政府到投資者，似乎也不計較業者們怎麼說，一昧急著想快快擺脫眼前的麻煩。官員大力護盤，公開信心喊話；投資散戶四處打聽：風暴快結束沒？是不是快觸底了？可不可以進場撿便宜了？這幾天，又開始有名嘴與老師們，大聲販賣「逢低買進」的概念。他們在電視上侃侃而談，向焦慮不安、失去方向感的投資人解釋，在這種時代，人還是要投資，風暴總會過去，聰明的，就要懂得在危機中入市。
危機入市，當然不是不行。但，危機究竟是如何發生，我們又是如何一步步邁入危機？沒弄懂，沒明白正確的方法，下回要怎樣迴避？
首先，危機當然還沒結束。銀行的倒閉骨牌秀，仍然在上演；那些被併購的、被轉手的，即將面臨全球性的裁員潮；全球不甘損失的憤怒投資人，正在串連打官司求償；這星期，大家都在看，規模排名第二的摩根史坦利，能不能度過這一關，會不會被中國人給吞掉。
其次，就算風暴過去，風險也不會停止。多年來，全球金融業最嚴重的錯誤，就是大量販賣被低估的風險。他們一方面，自以為能透過精密的算計，做穩賺不賠的生意，另一方面催眠散戶，讓大家以為基金低風險、股票能致富，人人都能賺大錢，把大筆大筆的存款，誘惑到高風險的金融市場中。
至於政府，也不應再跟著起舞。這次危機，不是意外，而是政府長期縱容的結果。一年來，經濟學家反覆警告，最壞的情況還沒到來；巴菲特早在二○○三年就提出對衍生性金融商品的憂心，認為這是顆「隨時引爆的定時炸彈」；前一年，李昂．里維在他臨終前的回憶錄中，也提醒人們注意建諸於信用擴張的金融活動，會腐蝕經濟的未來。然而，這些諍言，都被淹沒在業者們大量製造的廣告中，政府眼睜睜地，看著散戶繼續往火坑裡跳，也錯失了逃離虧損的先機。
不管是否順利逃離，投資人與政府，都要提醒自己別再犯同樣的錯誤。
很多人都知道在民间有所谓的“跟会”的投资玩意儿。目前美观的金融风暴就象是“会首”倒会的情形了，只是幅度是太大、太大了。
这里介绍一篇文章：-
財經漫遊：政府與投資者，都別再犯相同錯誤
沈雲驄
說實話，我不太相信，你真的明白雷曼兄弟、美林是怎麼垮的。就像你一定不知道，世界為了他們，到現在還亂成一團，但這些公司卻已悄悄佈局，就等你大駕光臨。
到雷曼兄弟官方網站看看。什麼破產，哪有災難，首頁上，這可是一家「全球金融創新者」，致力於「滿足政府、企業、高資產淨值投資人的需求」，且是「交易與研究」的「領先者」。營業狀況？網站上可以找到的財報，顯示著，過去五年來，公司不僅很賺錢，而且營業額、獲利能力、資產總額，年年都成長。那，最近的風暴是怎麼回事？很簡單，因為今年賠錢。不過，已經沒事了，新聞稿上輕描淡寫的說，雷曼兄弟北美的投資銀行與資本市場的業務──包括一萬名員工，以及最近遊客去拍照留念的總部大樓──都將由巴克萊銀行接手，繼續營業。安了。
不只是雷曼兄弟。看看已經易主的美林，官網首頁上，也毫不吝於跟大家分享自己已經被賣掉的消息，大方地寫著：「獲美國銀行收購」。網頁上引述美國銀行的話表示，能取得這麼一家「優質財富管理、資本市場與顧問公司，對我們的股東而言是很棒的機會」。「結合起來，」美國銀行董事長路易斯說：「我們的公司將更有價值。」
一副很有價值的樣子的，還包括半年前就已經出事的貝爾斯登。從這陣子媒體的報導來看，你很可能以為這公司早就壽終正寢。抱歉，錯了，貝爾斯登其實還在，而且「很高興地宣佈」，與摩根大通的合併已經完成。「這次併購，」該公司說：「結合了兩家優異的公司，以及最完整的金融服務。」然後，底下有個連結：「更多關於我們如何幫助客戶達到目標」。
也就是說，申請破產也好，被併購也好，風暴還沒過去，這些業者已把招牌擦亮，要繼續幫助你，完成你的財富夢想。這正是眼前這場金融危機，最可議與可怕之處。
可議的，是這些業者至今，沒有對自己的行為表示悔悟，絕口不提自己到底做錯了什麼、該負起什麼責任。不只美國，其他國家也一樣，業者們怪美國人捅出大婁子，怪總體經濟差，怪房地產冷，怪股市跌，也沒有說說看，自己不是標榜能幫顧客管理財富，不是口口聲聲能讓大家更有錢，為什麼沒有事先警告顧客，害得這麼多人賠錢？
可怕的，則是從政府到投資者，似乎也不計較業者們怎麼說，一昧急著想快快擺脫眼前的麻煩。官員大力護盤，公開信心喊話；投資散戶四處打聽：風暴快結束沒？是不是快觸底了？可不可以進場撿便宜了？這幾天，又開始有名嘴與老師們，大聲販賣「逢低買進」的概念。他們在電視上侃侃而談，向焦慮不安、失去方向感的投資人解釋，在這種時代，人還是要投資，風暴總會過去，聰明的，就要懂得在危機中入市。
危機入市，當然不是不行。但，危機究竟是如何發生，我們又是如何一步步邁入危機？沒弄懂，沒明白正確的方法，下回要怎樣迴避？
首先，危機當然還沒結束。銀行的倒閉骨牌秀，仍然在上演；那些被併購的、被轉手的，即將面臨全球性的裁員潮；全球不甘損失的憤怒投資人，正在串連打官司求償；這星期，大家都在看，規模排名第二的摩根史坦利，能不能度過這一關，會不會被中國人給吞掉。
其次，就算風暴過去，風險也不會停止。多年來，全球金融業最嚴重的錯誤，就是大量販賣被低估的風險。他們一方面，自以為能透過精密的算計，做穩賺不賠的生意，另一方面催眠散戶，讓大家以為基金低風險、股票能致富，人人都能賺大錢，把大筆大筆的存款，誘惑到高風險的金融市場中。
至於政府，也不應再跟著起舞。這次危機，不是意外，而是政府長期縱容的結果。一年來，經濟學家反覆警告，最壞的情況還沒到來；巴菲特早在二○○三年就提出對衍生性金融商品的憂心，認為這是顆「隨時引爆的定時炸彈」；前一年，李昂．里維在他臨終前的回憶錄中，也提醒人們注意建諸於信用擴張的金融活動，會腐蝕經濟的未來。然而，這些諍言，都被淹沒在業者們大量製造的廣告中，政府眼睜睜地，看著散戶繼續往火坑裡跳，也錯失了逃離虧損的先機。
不管是否順利逃離，投資人與政府，都要提醒自己別再犯同樣的錯誤。
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
916变天者要读
今天，916变天的传言真要把大马给颠覆了。这么多人关心，证明一点，大家都要求变。在这种情形下，领导人要知道怎么办。
就请大家读这篇不错的文章：
國際專欄─夏普的非暴力鬥爭
郭崇倫
政治學過去研究政治變遷與權力轉移時，很簡單的分為體制外的革命與體制內的選舉；但很多情況卻是兩者之外。譬如百日以來曼谷「人民民主聯盟」所領導的示威，既不同意重新選舉、也不同意公民複決，就是要求總理辭職；又譬如喬治亞與烏克蘭的「顏色革命」，都是從公民團體不滿選舉結果，指控不公開始，繼而占據首都市中心，發起大規模抗爭，迫使當權派讓步，重新選舉使得反對派上台。
他們採取的手段如此類似，不禁令人好奇是不是都詳讀了夏普﹝Gene Sharp﹞的非暴力鬥爭手冊《從獨裁到民主》（From Dictorship to Democracy）。
當然自他十五年前寫這本書之後，世界發生許多變化，不是夏普所可以預料到的；譬如網路與手機的發達。但是，夏普對抗獨裁政權的想法，卻歷久彌新；譬如警告與當權者談判的危險、剖析獨裁政權內部的弱點。他在書後詳列的一百九十八種非暴力抗議方式，羅列完備，更讓許多異議份子受益無窮；像是：模擬頒獎（第十四）、轉身蔑視（第五十四）、消極與緩慢的服從（第一一三）等。
年已八十，終身未婚的夏普，從研究生開始就對甘地與印度獨立運動非常關注，以研究非暴力抗爭為志願。在越戰期間，他身體力行，拒絕被徵召而下獄九個月。出獄後，他輾轉在英國與北歐求學、教書，最後落腳哈佛國際研究中心。
夏普其實從來不是一個行動家，書呆子也許是更好的形容。他的想法雖然付諸文字（七三年的九百頁巨著《非暴力行動的政治》），但要靠他人才能實現「市場價值」。他的第一位貴人竟是他的博士指導學生艾克曼；艾克曼畢業後，跟著華爾街大亨米肯，做垃圾債券買賣，賺了千萬家財，一九八三年他支助老師創辦愛因斯坦學社（Albert Einstein Institution），開始散播以非暴力方式對抗獨裁政權的方法。
四年後，一位美國前駐緬甸武官哈爾維在哈佛受訓時，接到夏普的傳單；出於好奇，他旁聽夏普上課，那時正值緬甸軍事政變，哈爾維立即感覺到非暴力途徑的效用，成了夏普的第二位貴人。三年後，哈爾維退伍，在邊境叢林教授反政府游擊隊非暴力手段，一九九二年，夏普受邀來視察「緬甸分班」，應當地游擊隊之請，寫了一本更易懂、更有操作性的手冊，從此誕生了《從獨裁到民主》。
這本手冊剛開始是在巴爾幹半島流傳，塞爾維亞青年反對團體Otpor用來發起全國不合作運動，逼使米洛塞維奇下台。接著，喬治亞與烏克蘭的政治異議份子到貝爾格勒來上課，導致喬治亞在二○○三年、烏克蘭在二○○五年政權接連更迭。誠如巴爾幹一位異議份子所說的，「你當然不可能進口社會革命，但是（革命的）知識是會轉移的」。
俄羅斯反對派也發現了這本書，網路下載翻成俄文，好不容易找到有勇氣的出版社印行，兩家販售的書店卻被焚。伊朗異議人士翻譯成波斯文，政府立即將夏普醜化為CIA間諜。
目前共有廿二種文字，包括西藏文、簡體中文可在網站免費下載（www.aeinstein.org/organizations98ce.html），就像善書一樣，夏普歡迎轉印散發，最近經費困難，大家各憑良心，每本捐助六美元。
夏普與台灣的淵源很早，黨外時代徐璐的《非暴力鬥爭的一一○種方法》就是取材於《非暴力行動的政治》。黃華擔任民進黨組織部主任時，也曾拜訪過波士頓的愛因斯坦學社。但最密切的則是在一九九四年，夏普曾應不分區立委林哲夫之邀來台兩周，南北演講十場；談的主題是群眾防衛，目標是嚇阻想要武力侵犯的敵國以及顛覆傀儡政權，引用的例子是立陶宛在九一年如何使用非暴力策略對抗蘇聯而重獲自由。
對抗獨裁者爭取民主，其實才是夏普的重點，但民進黨已經執政後，再強調非暴力鬥爭策略，就有些尷尬，民進黨後來強調夏普的非暴力只能是最後手段，「一切民眾的訴求都應該透過合法的程序立法」。
擁有權力者永遠強調合法，非法即意味著有些訴求被排除在外，累積的不正義一定造成反彈，否則紅衫軍、黃衫軍、「薔薇革命」又是怎麼產生的，這才是夏普手冊的真精神。 （clkuo@mail.chinatimes.com.tw）
就请大家读这篇不错的文章：
國際專欄─夏普的非暴力鬥爭
郭崇倫
政治學過去研究政治變遷與權力轉移時，很簡單的分為體制外的革命與體制內的選舉；但很多情況卻是兩者之外。譬如百日以來曼谷「人民民主聯盟」所領導的示威，既不同意重新選舉、也不同意公民複決，就是要求總理辭職；又譬如喬治亞與烏克蘭的「顏色革命」，都是從公民團體不滿選舉結果，指控不公開始，繼而占據首都市中心，發起大規模抗爭，迫使當權派讓步，重新選舉使得反對派上台。
他們採取的手段如此類似，不禁令人好奇是不是都詳讀了夏普﹝Gene Sharp﹞的非暴力鬥爭手冊《從獨裁到民主》（From Dictorship to Democracy）。
當然自他十五年前寫這本書之後，世界發生許多變化，不是夏普所可以預料到的；譬如網路與手機的發達。但是，夏普對抗獨裁政權的想法，卻歷久彌新；譬如警告與當權者談判的危險、剖析獨裁政權內部的弱點。他在書後詳列的一百九十八種非暴力抗議方式，羅列完備，更讓許多異議份子受益無窮；像是：模擬頒獎（第十四）、轉身蔑視（第五十四）、消極與緩慢的服從（第一一三）等。
年已八十，終身未婚的夏普，從研究生開始就對甘地與印度獨立運動非常關注，以研究非暴力抗爭為志願。在越戰期間，他身體力行，拒絕被徵召而下獄九個月。出獄後，他輾轉在英國與北歐求學、教書，最後落腳哈佛國際研究中心。
夏普其實從來不是一個行動家，書呆子也許是更好的形容。他的想法雖然付諸文字（七三年的九百頁巨著《非暴力行動的政治》），但要靠他人才能實現「市場價值」。他的第一位貴人竟是他的博士指導學生艾克曼；艾克曼畢業後，跟著華爾街大亨米肯，做垃圾債券買賣，賺了千萬家財，一九八三年他支助老師創辦愛因斯坦學社（Albert Einstein Institution），開始散播以非暴力方式對抗獨裁政權的方法。
四年後，一位美國前駐緬甸武官哈爾維在哈佛受訓時，接到夏普的傳單；出於好奇，他旁聽夏普上課，那時正值緬甸軍事政變，哈爾維立即感覺到非暴力途徑的效用，成了夏普的第二位貴人。三年後，哈爾維退伍，在邊境叢林教授反政府游擊隊非暴力手段，一九九二年，夏普受邀來視察「緬甸分班」，應當地游擊隊之請，寫了一本更易懂、更有操作性的手冊，從此誕生了《從獨裁到民主》。
這本手冊剛開始是在巴爾幹半島流傳，塞爾維亞青年反對團體Otpor用來發起全國不合作運動，逼使米洛塞維奇下台。接著，喬治亞與烏克蘭的政治異議份子到貝爾格勒來上課，導致喬治亞在二○○三年、烏克蘭在二○○五年政權接連更迭。誠如巴爾幹一位異議份子所說的，「你當然不可能進口社會革命，但是（革命的）知識是會轉移的」。
俄羅斯反對派也發現了這本書，網路下載翻成俄文，好不容易找到有勇氣的出版社印行，兩家販售的書店卻被焚。伊朗異議人士翻譯成波斯文，政府立即將夏普醜化為CIA間諜。
目前共有廿二種文字，包括西藏文、簡體中文可在網站免費下載（www.aeinstein.org/organizations98ce.html），就像善書一樣，夏普歡迎轉印散發，最近經費困難，大家各憑良心，每本捐助六美元。
夏普與台灣的淵源很早，黨外時代徐璐的《非暴力鬥爭的一一○種方法》就是取材於《非暴力行動的政治》。黃華擔任民進黨組織部主任時，也曾拜訪過波士頓的愛因斯坦學社。但最密切的則是在一九九四年，夏普曾應不分區立委林哲夫之邀來台兩周，南北演講十場；談的主題是群眾防衛，目標是嚇阻想要武力侵犯的敵國以及顛覆傀儡政權，引用的例子是立陶宛在九一年如何使用非暴力策略對抗蘇聯而重獲自由。
對抗獨裁者爭取民主，其實才是夏普的重點，但民進黨已經執政後，再強調非暴力鬥爭策略，就有些尷尬，民進黨後來強調夏普的非暴力只能是最後手段，「一切民眾的訴求都應該透過合法的程序立法」。
擁有權力者永遠強調合法，非法即意味著有些訴求被排除在外，累積的不正義一定造成反彈，否則紅衫軍、黃衫軍、「薔薇革命」又是怎麼產生的，這才是夏普手冊的真精神。 （clkuo@mail.chinatimes.com.tw）
Saturday, September 13, 2008
民营 V 国营
国营公司一大堆烂摊子世界各地皆然。
財經漫遊─睜開眼睛，看看誰在制高點上
沈雲驄
雖沒明講，但全世界都知道，被美國財政部接管的房地美與房利美，是不折不扣的「國營」企業。錢，國家出；人，國家管；專業經理人？滾吧；股東？閃邊去。
怎麼回事？不是大家都說，企業，是民營的好。國營，是低效率、浪費、米蟲的代名詞；要民營，才代表著有效率，會賺錢，才是拚經濟的王道。怎麼，二十一世紀才剛開始，在美國這個世界資本主義的大本營，國家居然伸出手，反倒把民營變國營了呢？
沒有官員回答。財長鮑爾森翻來覆去，根本不願意直接說出國營化這個辭，當然不會有什麼解釋；各國央行與財政官員，慶幸著自己滿手的二房商品有救，免於賠了人民的錢而灰頭土臉，高興都來不及，怎會有什麼批判檢討。只要有救，國營，就國營吧。
政府不肯面對，人民卻不能視如不見。現代國營企業的概念，濫觴於一次大戰後的歐洲，當時許多國家相信，政府的角色，是擬定國家經濟發展的目標，預設重點發展的產業。這些產業能民營的，就讓民間經營，民間無意願或無力集資的，就由政府出錢。「政府必須站在制高點上，」一九二二年底，列寧在推出著名的「新經濟政策」時說，帶領人民做對的事情。
往後半個多世紀，列寧口中的制高點（commanding height），成了全球現代化的引擎。從歐洲、亞洲、中南美洲，政府紛紛站到制高點，透過國營企業完成許多重要的公共建設，達成民間企業無力完成的任務，推動了經濟成長。從能源到農業，只要是民間缺乏資金與意願做、但國家又有需要的產業，就由國營企業來負責。
但是漸漸的，這些國營企業達成任務之後，出現了大家今天所熟知的老化與腐敗，經營效率不彰、服務品質惡劣。本應扮演「制高點」角色的國營企業，不是成了政治權貴眼中的肥肉，就是成了收容無能官僚的肥缺。罵聲連連中，也掀起了過去二十年來，席捲全球的民營化風潮。
問題是，早在這回二房民營轉國營之前，人們就已經發現，民營化，也怪怪的。一來，為什麼民營化之後，這些原本屬於國家、也因此屬於人民的企業，都納入了大財團的麾下，反而沒有了人「民」的影子？還有，為什麼很多國營企業，明明已經民營化了，政府還是三不五時的，得拿人民的錢，去協助這些企業？
看看房地美與房利美，不是年年季季有財報？不是天天被數以百萬計精明的投資與投機客盯著瞧？不是有號稱要負責維持交易秩序的證管會在把關，怎麼，就沒人發現表面上業績漂亮，股價不便宜的這兩家公司，骨子裡全是爛帳？搞到今天，國家必須出手，搞到財政部長包爾森半夜睡不著，得趁著週末，緊急出來宣佈接管？
鮑爾森的救援，正暴露了政府長期棄守「制高點」的難堪事實。十幾年來，在把國營企業奉送給財團的過程中，政府忘記了，自己必須替人民看守制高點的責任，它們縱容財團們追逐自己的利益，放任企業經理人們肆無忌憚地霸佔利潤。這星期，德州參議員康能提案，要求調查房地美與房利美專業經理人應負的刑事責任，算是一記遲來的警鐘。接下來呢？
在政府棄守制高點情況下，所出現自由資本市場失靈現象，也是不容再忽視的問題。沒錯，資本市場曾經為富國與窮國都帶來了財富，但現在，這個財富的天平已經明顯傾斜，讓財富愈來愈集中在少數人手上；過去，資本市場曾經是就業機會的製造機，現在，這部機器已經失控；照理說，資本市場可讓窮國翻身，但看看越南，很多窮國還沒翻身，就背上了投機國度的罵名。
用國家的資源，拿人民的納稅錢，去拯救民營公司，當然不是好方法；政府重拾國營概念，把大生意拿回來自己經營，也不是好主意。政府應該做的，是站回到制高點上，繼續擔起人民與企業無法完成的任務。比方說，教育與保健，經濟條件再壞，政府都要持續投資與改革；政府必須站上制高點，看管人民的利益，讓資本市場能在公平合理的前提下運作，不讓少數人假自由市場之名，掠奪經濟改善的果實；還有，那些在企業眼中無利可圖、卻又重要的社會政策，諸如環境品質的維護等，總該有人站到制高點上，保護人民。不是嗎？
財經漫遊─睜開眼睛，看看誰在制高點上
沈雲驄
雖沒明講，但全世界都知道，被美國財政部接管的房地美與房利美，是不折不扣的「國營」企業。錢，國家出；人，國家管；專業經理人？滾吧；股東？閃邊去。
怎麼回事？不是大家都說，企業，是民營的好。國營，是低效率、浪費、米蟲的代名詞；要民營，才代表著有效率，會賺錢，才是拚經濟的王道。怎麼，二十一世紀才剛開始，在美國這個世界資本主義的大本營，國家居然伸出手，反倒把民營變國營了呢？
沒有官員回答。財長鮑爾森翻來覆去，根本不願意直接說出國營化這個辭，當然不會有什麼解釋；各國央行與財政官員，慶幸著自己滿手的二房商品有救，免於賠了人民的錢而灰頭土臉，高興都來不及，怎會有什麼批判檢討。只要有救，國營，就國營吧。
政府不肯面對，人民卻不能視如不見。現代國營企業的概念，濫觴於一次大戰後的歐洲，當時許多國家相信，政府的角色，是擬定國家經濟發展的目標，預設重點發展的產業。這些產業能民營的，就讓民間經營，民間無意願或無力集資的，就由政府出錢。「政府必須站在制高點上，」一九二二年底，列寧在推出著名的「新經濟政策」時說，帶領人民做對的事情。
往後半個多世紀，列寧口中的制高點（commanding height），成了全球現代化的引擎。從歐洲、亞洲、中南美洲，政府紛紛站到制高點，透過國營企業完成許多重要的公共建設，達成民間企業無力完成的任務，推動了經濟成長。從能源到農業，只要是民間缺乏資金與意願做、但國家又有需要的產業，就由國營企業來負責。
但是漸漸的，這些國營企業達成任務之後，出現了大家今天所熟知的老化與腐敗，經營效率不彰、服務品質惡劣。本應扮演「制高點」角色的國營企業，不是成了政治權貴眼中的肥肉，就是成了收容無能官僚的肥缺。罵聲連連中，也掀起了過去二十年來，席捲全球的民營化風潮。
問題是，早在這回二房民營轉國營之前，人們就已經發現，民營化，也怪怪的。一來，為什麼民營化之後，這些原本屬於國家、也因此屬於人民的企業，都納入了大財團的麾下，反而沒有了人「民」的影子？還有，為什麼很多國營企業，明明已經民營化了，政府還是三不五時的，得拿人民的錢，去協助這些企業？
看看房地美與房利美，不是年年季季有財報？不是天天被數以百萬計精明的投資與投機客盯著瞧？不是有號稱要負責維持交易秩序的證管會在把關，怎麼，就沒人發現表面上業績漂亮，股價不便宜的這兩家公司，骨子裡全是爛帳？搞到今天，國家必須出手，搞到財政部長包爾森半夜睡不著，得趁著週末，緊急出來宣佈接管？
鮑爾森的救援，正暴露了政府長期棄守「制高點」的難堪事實。十幾年來，在把國營企業奉送給財團的過程中，政府忘記了，自己必須替人民看守制高點的責任，它們縱容財團們追逐自己的利益，放任企業經理人們肆無忌憚地霸佔利潤。這星期，德州參議員康能提案，要求調查房地美與房利美專業經理人應負的刑事責任，算是一記遲來的警鐘。接下來呢？
在政府棄守制高點情況下，所出現自由資本市場失靈現象，也是不容再忽視的問題。沒錯，資本市場曾經為富國與窮國都帶來了財富，但現在，這個財富的天平已經明顯傾斜，讓財富愈來愈集中在少數人手上；過去，資本市場曾經是就業機會的製造機，現在，這部機器已經失控；照理說，資本市場可讓窮國翻身，但看看越南，很多窮國還沒翻身，就背上了投機國度的罵名。
用國家的資源，拿人民的納稅錢，去拯救民營公司，當然不是好方法；政府重拾國營概念，把大生意拿回來自己經營，也不是好主意。政府應該做的，是站回到制高點上，繼續擔起人民與企業無法完成的任務。比方說，教育與保健，經濟條件再壞，政府都要持續投資與改革；政府必須站上制高點，看管人民的利益，讓資本市場能在公平合理的前提下運作，不讓少數人假自由市場之名，掠奪經濟改善的果實；還有，那些在企業眼中無利可圖、卻又重要的社會政策，諸如環境品質的維護等，總該有人站到制高點上，保護人民。不是嗎？
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